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Defendant Angel Amaya came before me for sentencing on June 11, 2013, after 
being convicted by a jury of conspiring to possess with intent to distribute 50 grams or 
more of pure methamphetamine or a mixture or substance containing 500 grams of 
methamphetamine, 5 kilograms or more of cocaine, and marijuana, in violation of 21 
U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A), 841(b)(1)(C), and 846, and  conspiring to commit 
money laundering, in violation of 18  U.S.C. §§ 1956(a)(1)(A)(i), 1956(a)(1)(B)(i), 
1956(a)(1)(B)(ii), and 1956(h).  Facing a possible life sentence, Amaya moved for a 
downward variance from his advisory guideline sentence based on what he 
characterizes as the prosecution’s “double jeopardy violation” as well as the need to 
avoid unwarranted sentencing disparity among defendants.  I concluded that a sentence 
within the advisory guideline sentence range was “greater than necessary” to 
accomplish the goals of sentencing, in light of all of the pertinent factors.  See 18 
U.S.C. § 3553(a).  Accordingly, I granted Amaya’s motion for a downward variance, 
albeit on different grounds than those raised by Amaya, based on my independent 
obligation to apply the § 3553(a) factors.  I now enter this written explanation of my 
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rationale for a sentence tailored to Amaya’s circumstances in light of the applicable 
guidelines and 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors.  Unfortunately for Amaya, this still 
resulted in a sentence of 180 months. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A. The Charges 
In a two-count Superseding Indictment returned on July 28, 2011, defendant 
Angel Amaya and four co-defendants were charged with conspiracy to possess with 
intent to distribute 50 grams or more of pure methamphetamine or a mixture or 
substance containing 500 grams of methamphetamine, 5 kilograms or more of cocaine, 
and marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A), 841(b)(1)(C), and 
846, and with conspiracy to commit money laundering, in violation of 18  U.S.C. §§ 
1956(a)(1)(A)(i), 1956(a)(1)(B)(i), 1956(a)(1)(B)(ii), and 1956(h). 
 
B. The Trials 
The first attempt to try Amaya on the charges against him began on October 11, 
2011.1  However, I declared a mistrial that day, when the prosecution’s first witness, a 
government agent, referred to material barred by a sealed ruling on a motion in limine.2  
The second attempt to try Amaya began on December 19, 2011, but it fared no better.  
I granted another mistrial on the first day, again during the testimony of the 
prosecution’s first witness, the same government agent, when that witness disclosed for 
the first time the use of GPS devices to collect evidence in this case.  I then entertained 
                                       
1 Amaya was tried with his brother and co-defendant, Javier Amaya. 
 
2 The ruling on the motion in limine had not been provided to the agent prior to 
his testimony. 
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briefing on whether or not the second mistrial should result in dismissal with prejudice 
based on prosecutorial misconduct.  On January 26, 2012, after considering the parties’ 
briefs and hearing oral arguments, I concluded that the defendants had failed to meet 
the demanding standard for dismissal with prejudice after a mistrial.  
The third attempt to try Amaya began on May 29, 2012. Although this trial 
proceeded past the first witness without a hitch, the jinx on the case continued, because 
the first day of the third trial did not pass without another motion for mistrial.  In this 
instance, during the redirect examination of witness Jorge Aguilar, the prosecution 
vouched for the witness by making an inadvertent declarative statement in response to 
the witness’s testimony that he was telling the truth.  Amaya made no objection or 
comment at the time of the prosecutor’s statement nor after I brought the matter to the 
parties’ attention.  Notwithstanding the lack of a contemporaneous objection or 
comment, Amaya filed a Motion For Mistrial And/Or Curative Instruction after regular 
business hours on May 29, 2012.  I took up Amaya’s motion the following morning 
and, after hearing the parties’ arguments, I gave a curative instruction to the jury.  The 
trial continued without further incident on May 30, May 31, and June 1, 2012.  
Altogether, the prosecution called twenty witnesses.  The prosecution rested on June 1, 
2012, and Amaya rested immediately thereafter without calling any witnesses.   Later 
that day, the jury returned a verdict in which it found Amaya guilty of all charged 
offenses. 
Amaya subsequently filed a Motion For New Trial And Judgment Of Acquittal 
And/Or Renewed Motion For Mistrial.  I heard oral arguments on Amaya’s post-trial 
motions on August 2, 2012, and denied them in a lengthy memorandum opinion and 
order on August 10, 2012.  See United States v. Amaya, No. CR11-4065-MWB, 2012 
WL 3288082, at *35 (N.D. Iowa Aug. 10, 2012). 
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C. The Sentencing Hearing 
On October 24, 2012, Amaya filed a Motion for Downward Variance and 
supporting brief. In his motion, Amaya argues that I should “consider the double 
jeopardy violation as a factor that would justify a variance down to 120 months.”  
Defendant’s Br. at 6.  He argues that the prosecution has not been sanctioned for 
causing two mistrials while the resulting delays have subjected him to “embarrassment, 
expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and 
insecurity for months.”  Defendant’s Br. at 7.  He also argues that the need to avoid 
unwarranted sentencing disparity among defendants supports a downward variance.  On 
the same date, the prosecution filed a sentencing memorandum.  The prosecution 
resisted Amaya’s Motion for Downward Variance on October 26, 2012.  On October 
29, 2012, Amaya filed a response to the prosecution’s sentencing memorandum.  A 
sentencing hearing for Amaya began on October 30, 2012.  The United States was 
represented by AUSA Timothy T. Duax of Sioux City, Iowa and Amaya was 
represented by R. Scott Rhinehart of the Rhinehart Law Firm, P.C., in Sioux City, 
Iowa.  At the hearing, the prosecution presented documentary evidence and the 
testimony of two witnesses, Ana Cortes and Greg Fox.  I heard oral arguments from 
the parties on Amaya’s Motion for Downward Variance.  Rather than imposing 
sentence that day, in order to permit myself time to give due consideration to my 
concerns regarding the appropriateness of a downward variance under the Sentencing 
Guidelines and to determine the appropriate sentence for Amaya, I completed the 
sentencing hearing on June 11, 2013.  I now state the reasons for the sentence imposed 
on Amaya. 
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II. LEGAL ANALYIS 
A. Sentencing Methodology:  Computing the Guideline 
Range; Departures; and Variances  
Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Gall, the Eighth Circuit Court of 
Appeals has repeatedly stated the methodology for determining a defendant’s sentence 
as follows: 
The district court should begin “by correctly calculating the 
applicable Guidelines range.”  “[T]he Guidelines should be 
the starting point and the initial benchmark [,but] [t]he 
Guidelines are not the only consideration[.]” The district 
judge should allow “both parties an opportunity to argue for 
whatever sentence they deem appropriate,” and then should 
“consider all of the § 3553(a) factors to determine whether 
they support the sentence requested by a party.” 
United States v. Hill, 552 F.3d 686, 691 (8th Cir. 2009) (quoting Gall v. United 
States, 552 U.S. 38, 49 (2007)) (internal citations omitted); United States v. Roberson, 
517 F.3d 990, 993 (8th Cir. 2008); see also United States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d 455, 
461-62 (8th Cir. 2009) (en banc). 
The Supreme Court has recognized that a party’s argument for a sentence outside 
the calculated guideline range may “take either of two forms.” Rita v. United States, 
551 U.S. 338, 344 (2007).  A party may “argue within the Guidelines’ framework, for 
a departure,” id. (emphasis in original), or a party may “argue that, independent of the 
Guidelines, application of the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) warrants a 
[different] sentence.”  Id 3  The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has made clear that, 
                                       
3 As the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained: 
 
“‘Departure” is a term of art under the Guidelines and refers 
only to non-Guidelines sentences imposed under the 
framework set out in the Guidelines.” Irizarry v. United 
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while “similar factors may justify either a variance or a traditional departure,” United 
States v. Woods, 670 F.3d 883, 888 (8th Cir. 2012), district courts are not limited by 
the Guidelines’ departure policy framework when determining whether and by what 
extent to vary, see United States v. Chase, 560 F.3d 828, 832 (8th Cir. 2009); United 
States v. VandeBrake, 679 F.3d 1030, 1037 (8th Cir. 2012); see also United States v. 
Villareal-Amarillas, 562 F.3d 892, 898 (8th Cir. 2009) (“The judge is cabined, but also 
liberated, by the § 3553(a) factors.”).4   
As a matter of procedure, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has instructed that 
district courts should “continue to engage in the three-step process of first ascertaining 
the applicable Guidelines range, then considering any permissible departures within the 
Guidelines’ structure, and finally, deciding whether a non-Guidelines sentence would be 
more appropriate under the circumstances pursuant to § 3553(a).”  See United States v. 
Washington, 515 F.3d 861, 866 (8th Cir. 2008). 
Although “a court of appeals may apply a presumption of reasonableness when 
conducting substantive review of a sentence within the advisory range, ‘the sentencing 
court does not enjoy the benefit of a legal presumption that the Guidelines sentence 
should apply.’” United States v. Henson, 550 F.3d 739, 740 (8th Cir. 2008) (quoting 
Rita 551 U.S. at 351).  The Supreme Court has emphasized this point, noting “[o]ur 
                                                                                                                           
States, 553 U.S. 708 (2008). A variance, on the other hand, 
is a “non-Guidelines sentence[ ] based on the factors 
enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” United States v. Solis-
Bermudez, 501 F.3d 882, 884 (8th Cir. 2007).  
United States v. Mireles, 617 F.3d 1009, 1012 n.2 (8th Cir. 2010). 
  
4 See Irizarry, 553 U.S. at 714-15 (“[T]here is no longer a limit comparable to [a 
departure] on the variances from Guidelines ranges that a district court may find 
justified under the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).”).   
 
Case 5:11-cr-04065-MWB   Document 513   Filed 06/11/13   Page 7 of 46
8 
 
cases do not allow a sentencing court to presume that a sentence within the applicable 
Guidelines range is reasonable,” and that “[t]he Guidelines are not only not mandatory 
on sentencing courts; they are also not to be presumed reasonable.”  Nelson v. United 
States, 129 S. Ct. 890, 892 (2009) (per curiam) (emphasis in the original). 
As the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has also explained, “[w]e may not 
require “‘extraordinary’ circumstances to justify a sentence outside the Guidelines.”  
Feemster, 572 F.3d at 462 (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 47). Instead, the district court 
must “make an individualized assessment based on the facts 
presented.” [Gall, 552 U.S. at 50.] If the court concludes 
that a sentence outside of the Guidelines range is warranted, 
then it must “consider the extent of the deviation and ensure 
that the justification is sufficiently compelling to support the 
degree of the variance.” Id. “[A] major departure should be 
supported by a more significant justification than a minor 
one.”  Id. After the district court determines the 
“appropriate sentence,” it must then “adequately explain the 
chosen sentence to allow for meaningful appellate review 
and to promote the perception of fair sentencing.” Id. 
Feemster, 572 F.3d at 461. 
First, I will determine the advisory guideline range for Amaya.  Next, I will 
determine whether any traditional departures, either upward or downward, are 
warranted.  Third, I will consider whether to vary from the advisory guideline range 
based on my independent obligation to apply the § 3553(a) factors. 
 
B. Step 1-Determining The Guideline Range  
The first step in the sentencing process is to determine the proper guideline range 
for the defendant’s sentence.  See United States v. Lozoya, 623 F.3d 624, 625 (8th Cir. 
2010) (“In sentencing a defendant, a district court must first determine the advisory 
sentencing range as recommended by the Guidelines.”); see also United States v. 
Case 5:11-cr-04065-MWB   Document 513   Filed 06/11/13   Page 8 of 46
9 
 
Mireles, 617 F.3d 1009, 1012 (8th Cir. 2010); Roberson, 517 F.3d at 993.  In 
determining Amaya’s advisory guideline range, I used the November 1, 2012, edition 
of the United States Sentencing Commission Guidelines Manual.  See Lozoya, 623 F.3d 
at 625; see also VandeBrake, 679 F.3d at 1039 n.7.   
The Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”) set Amaya’s base offense level at 
36, pursuant to U.S.S.G. §§ 2D1.1 and 2S1.1, and recommended the following 
enhancements based on Amaya’s relevant conduct: 1) a two-level enhancement, 
pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1(b)(2)(B), for his § 1956 conviction; 2) a two-level 
enhancement, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.4, for using a minor to commit the offense; 
3) a three-level enhancement, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(b), because Amaya was a 
manager or supervisor and the criminal activity involved five or more participants; and 
4) a three-level enhancement, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, because Amaya willfully 
obstructed or attempted to obstruct the investigation or prosecution of the charged 
offenses.  Thus, the PSR set Amaya’s adjusted offense level at 45.  However, the PSR 
reset Amaya’s total offense level as 43, because an “offense level of more than 43 is to 
be treated as an offense level of 43.”  U.S.S.G. Ch. 5, Pt. A, cmt. n.2; see United 
States v. Okun, 453 Fed. App’x 364, 373 (4th Cir. 2011) (“A total offense level of 
more than 43 is to be treated as an offense level of 43.”); United States v. Smith, 437 
Fed. App’x 110, 112 n.2 (3d Cir. 2011) (“An offense level of more than 43 is treated 
as an offense level of 43 under the guidelines.”).  At this offense level, the United 
States Sentencing Guidelines recommends a life sentence.   
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Amaya has objected to these enhancements.5  Thus, before I can calculate 
Amaya’s proper guideline sentence I must resolve his objections to those portions of the 
PSR which affect his guideline range. 
1. Amaya’s objections to the PSR 
a. Aggravating role in the offense 
Amaya objects to the recommendation in the PSR that he receive a three level 
upward adjustment as a manager or supervisor in the money laundering offense, 
pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(b).6   See PSR at ¶ 23. Specifically, Amaya argues: 
Defendant Amaya did not manage or control Munoz, 
Forbes, Wenzel, Deanda, Cancino-Torres or Dwyer.  Each 
of these individuals had their own drug operation.  
Sometimes they bought from Angel Amaya, sometimes they 
sold to Defendants.  It was a question of who had what 
available drugs at the particular time.  The Government fails 
to recognize that out of all the parties involved in this case, 
Eduardo Deanda was by far the biggest drug dealer with his 
own operation.  Deanda wanted Defendant Amaya to partner 
with him on a drug deal.  Defendant Amaya refused.  
Nevertheless, for some reason, the Government contends 
that his refusal constitutes a conspiracy or that the quantities 
that Deanda was pushing should somehow be attributable to 
Defendant Amaya.  
                                       
5 Amaya objected to the specific drug quantities attributed to him in the PSR.  
See PSR ¶¶ 8-9.  However, he did not object to the PSR’s recommended base offense 
level of 36, which is based on the conclusion that the drug conspiracy involved 
15,703.80 kilograms of marijuana equivalent. See PSR ¶ 19.  Because I find that the 
charged drug conspiracy involved at least 10,000 kilograms, but less than 30,000 
kilograms of marijuana equivalent, Amaya’s objections to specific drug quantities do 
not affect his base offense level and I need not resolve them.  
 
6 The PSR did not recommend that Amaya receive an upward adjustment for his 
role in the drug conspiracy.  See PSR at ¶ 23. 
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Noris was a cocaine addict.  Noris was never dealing 
with Defendant Amaya as he testified to at trial.  The U.S. 
Attorney’s “assumption” that Defendant Amaya was some 
kind of kingpin or major source of supply is in error.  
Defendant Amaya did not control any of the Government 
cooperators in this case with the exception of Brendan Uhl 
and Octavio Noris.  Defendant Amaya did use Brendan 
Uhl’s address for their mutual benefit.  To suggest that 
Defendant Amaya was a manager or supervisor of any of 
these folks is erroneous.  This is true as it relates to the bank 
deposits as well.  In this case, Defendant Amaya did provide 
deposited funds through Wells Fargo Bank.  Defendant 
Amaya’s roommate and now convicted felon, Luis Bernal, 
used the Bank of America for transferring funds as part of 
his operation.  The Government’s assumption that Defendant 
Amaya was regularly using Bank of America is mistaken.  
Defendant Amaya did coordinate drug transactions to control 
other people.  For example, Shawn Forbes brought six 
ounces of cocaine to Defendant Amaya’s house.  Defendant 
Amaya took five ounces, Munoz took one ounce.  Forbes 
also had several pounds of marijuana in his car.  Defendant 
Amaya called Dan Wenzel over to buy the marijuana for 
Wenzel’s own use.  Defendant Amaya did send Octavio 
Noris down to Omaha with $35,000.00 however Noris 
mistakenly only took $30,000.00 down.  Defendant Amaya 
did control Noris to a certain extent on this occasion. 
Defendant’s Objections To First Draft Of Presentence Investigation Report at ¶¶ 
14-15 (“Defendant’s Objections”) (attached to PSR).  The prosecution also objects to 
paragraph 23 of the PSR.  However, the prosecution argues that Amaya should receive 
a four level upward adjustment because he should be considered an organizer or leader 
in the criminal activity, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a).   
Under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a), a court should increase a defendant’s offense level 
by four levels if defendant “was an organizer or leader of a criminal activity that 
involved five or more participants or was otherwise extensive.” If a defendant was a 
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“manager or supervisor” of a criminal activity involving five or more participants or 
that was otherwise extensive, then a court should increase the defendant’s offense level 
by three levels. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(b).  If a defendant “was an organizer, leader, 
manager, or supervisor in any criminal activity other than described in (a) or (b), 
increase by 2 levels.”  U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c).  The terms “manager,” “supervisor,” 
“organizer,” and “leader” are all broadly construed.  See United States v. Frausto, 636 
F.3d 992, 996 (8th Cir. 2011) (“‘Each of these four terms is construed broadly.’” ) 
(quoting United States v. De Oliveira, 623 F.3d 593, 599 (8th Cir. 2010)); see also 
United States v. Moreno, 679 F.3d 1003, 1004 (8th Cir. 2012) (“This court construes 
‘manager’ and ‘supervisor’ broadly.”); United States v. Payton, 636 F.3d 1027, 1048 
(8th Cir. 2011) (“‘We construe the terms ‘manager’ or ‘supervisor’ broadly. . .”) 
(quoting United States v. Bolden, 622 F.3d 988, 990 (8th Cir. 2010)); United States v. 
Sarabia-Martinez, 276 F.3d 447, 451 (8th Cir. 2002) (“The terms ‘organizer’ and 
‘leader’ are to be broadly interpreted.”). 
Under § 3B1.1, “[a] ‘participant’ is a person who is criminally responsible for 
the commission of the offense, but need not have been convicted.”7  U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 
cmt. n.1. In distinguishing a leadership and organizational role from one of 
management or supervision, courts are encouraged to consider: 
the exercise of decision making authority, the nature of 
participation in the commission of the offense, the 
                                       
7 Customers do not typically qualify as participants for purposes of § 3B1.1.  See 
United States v. Egge, 223 F.3d 1128, 1133 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[M]erely purchasing 
drugs from the seller, without more, does not qualify that customer as a participant for 
the purposes of the [§ 3B1.1] enhancement.”); United States v. Belletiere, 971 F.2d, 
961, 970 (3d Cir. 1992) (“Before a . . . customer may be deemed to have been a 
‘controlled’ participant under [§ 3B1.1], the government must prove at least an 
interdependence between the defendant and the . . . customer that would support an 
inference that the . . . customer for personal use is answerable to the defendant.”). 
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recruitment of accomplices, the claimed right to a larger 
share of the fruits of the crime, the degree of participation in 
planning or organizing the offense, the nature and scope of 
the illegal activity, and the degree of control and authority 
exercised over others. 
U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 cmt. n. 4.  In addition, the background to § 3B1.1 provides that: 
In relatively small criminal enterprises that are not otherwise 
to be considered as extensive in scope or in planning or 
preparation, the distinction between organization and 
leadership, and that of management or supervision, is of less 
significance than in larger enterprises that tend to have 
clearly delineated divisions of responsibility. This is 
reflected in the inclusiveness of § 3B1.1(c). 
Id. at cmt. background. 
The prosecution must prove a § 3B1.1 enhancement by a preponderance of the 
evidence.  See Moreno, 679 F.3d at 1004; United States v. Rodriguez-Ramos, 663 F.3d 
356, 365 (8th Cir. 2011); United States v. Gaines, 639 F.3d 423, 427 (8th Cir. 2011); 
Payton, 636 F.3d at 1048; United States v. Garcia–Hernandez, 530 F.3d 657, 665 (8th 
Cir. 2008).  However, Amaya need only have directed one other participant to warrant 
an enhancement.  See Rodriguez-Ramos, 663 F.3d at 365; Payton, 636 F.3d at 1048; 
United States v. Johnson, 619 F.3d 910, 921 (8th Cir. 2010); United States v. 
Mendoza, 341 F.3d 687, 694 (8th Cir. 2003); United States v. Eis, 322 F.3d 1023, 
1025 (8th Cir. 2003); United States v. Sarabia–Martinez, 276 F.3d 447, 451 (8th Cir. 
2002). 
In his objections to the PSR, Amaya concedes that he sent Jorge Aguilar to 
Omaha with $35,000 and that he controlled Aguilar “to a certain extent on this 
Case 5:11-cr-04065-MWB   Document 513   Filed 06/11/13   Page 13 of 46
14 
 
occasion.”8 Defendant’s Objections at ¶15.  Aguilar testified at trial that Amaya 
summoned him to his home and, once there, told Aguilar that he needed Aguilar to take 
$35,000 to Omaha to pay somebody.  Trial Tr. at 67.  Aguilar also testified that Amaya 
had him make cash deposits in bank accounts that were not in either Amaya or 
Aguilar’s name.  Trial Tr. at 55.  On another occasion, Aguilar opened a bank account 
at Amaya’s request and then deposited money into the account given to him by Amaya.  
Trial Tr. at 56-57.  Thus, at minimum, a two-level managerial role enhancement 
applies to Amaya.  See Johnson, 619 F.3d at 921 (“‘For a two-level managerial role 
enhancement to apply, it is only necessary that the defendant supervise or manage one 
other participant.’”) (quoting United States v. Parish, 565 F.3d 528, 532 (8th Cir. 
2009)). 
To qualify for either the four level enhancement as an organizer or leader under 
§ 3B1.1(a), or the three level enhancement as a manager or supervisor under § 
3B1.1(b), Amaya must be involved with a criminal activity “that involved five or more 
participants or was otherwise extensive.”  U.S.S.G. §§ 3B.1(a)-(b).  A defendant may 
be included when determining whether there were five or more participants in the 
criminal activity.  See United States v. Harry, 960 F.2d 51, 53 (8th Cir. 1992); United 
States v. Blandino, 954 F.2d 1436, 1437 n.2 (8th Cir. 1992); see also United States v. 
Lopez, 392 Fed. App’x 245, 256 (5th Cir. 2010); United States v. Ware, 577 F.3d 442, 
451 (2nd Cir. 2009); United States v. Egge, 223 F.3d 1128, 1134 (9th Cir. 2000); 
United States v. Paccione, 202 F.3d 622, 625 (2d Cir. 2000); United States v. 
Hardwell, 80 F.3d 1471, 1496 (10th Cir. 1996); United States v. Holland, 22 F.3d 
1040, 1045 (11th Cir. 1994); United States v. Fells, 920 F.2d 1179, 1182 (4th Cir. 
                                       
8 In his objection, Amaya incorrectly identified Octavio Noris as the individual 
he sent to Omaha.  At his sentencing hearing, Amaya admitted that he had misidentified 
the currency courier as Noris when in fact it was Aguilar. 
Case 5:11-cr-04065-MWB   Document 513   Filed 06/11/13   Page 14 of 46
15 
 
1990); United States v. Barbontin, 907 F.2d 1494, 1498 (5th Cir. 1990); United States 
v. Preakos, 907 F.2d 7, 10 (1st Cir. 1990).  In arguing that a four level enhancement is 
appropriate, the prosecution contends that Jorge Aguilar, Rafael Munoz, Shawn 
Forbes, Luis Deanda, Gilberto Apolonio, Didier Cancino-Torres, Brandon Uhl, Dan 
Wenzel, and Octavio Noris were all participants in Amaya’s drug and money 
laundering conspiracies.  Prosecution Sentencing Mem. at 8.  The flaw in the 
prosecution’s argument is that Amaya is charged with participating in two separate 
conspiracies, a drug conspiracy and a money laundering conspiracy, and these 
individuals were not necessarily participants in both.  Of the individuals identified by 
the prosecution, only two qualify as participants in the money laundering conspiracy, 
Aguilar and Noris.9  In addition, for the purposes of Angel Amaya’s sentencing only, I 
                                       
9 I find that the prosecution has not established that Apolonio was a participant in 
either conspiracy.  Apolonio did not testify at trial. So, unlike the other individuals 
identified as participants by the prosecution, there is no admission by Apolonio of his 
involvement in either conspiracy.  In addition, there were less than a dozen fleeting 
references to him during the entire trial.  Moreover, Apolonio was acquitted of drug 
charges in state court.  The prosecution did introduce two banking documents, a bank 
deposit slip and a withdrawal slip, in Apolonio’s name. Prosecution Exs. 19e and 20c. 
Both, however, are problematic.  Christy Menke, a bank service manager, testified that 
anybody could deposit money into anybody else’s account.  Trial Tr. at 106. Thus, the 
deposit slip, standing alone, does not establish that Apolonio actually made the deposit 
represented in it.  Regarding the withdrawal slip, Aguilar testified that Apolonio went 
with him and Amaya to California, and, while there, Apolonio made a bank 
withdrawal.  Trial Tr. at 62-63. However, Aguilar testified that he was not present 
when the withdrawal was made.  Trial Tr. at 105.  Thus, the circumstances of the 
withdrawal are entirely unknown.  On this limited record, the prosecution has not 
established that Apolonio was a participant in the money laundering conspiracy.  
Evidence of Apolonio’s involvement with the drug conspiracy is equally unconvincing.  
The only evidence presented at trial of Apolonio’s involvement in the drug conspiracy 
was the following testimony by Deanda: 
 
Case 5:11-cr-04065-MWB   Document 513   Filed 06/11/13   Page 15 of 46
16 
 
find that the prosecution has established by a preponderance of the evidence that Javier 
Amaya was a participant in the money laundering conspiracy.  Thus, counting Amaya, 
I find that there were only four participants in the money laundering conspiracy and not 
the requisite five.  Amaya, therefore, does not qualify for either a three or four level 
upward adjustment for his involvement in the money laundering conspiracy. 
The prosecution has proven the required five or more participants in the drug 
conspiracy, but has not established that Amaya was an organizer, leader, manager, or 
supervisor in this criminal activity.  Amaya argues that he was merely a buyer and/or 
seller of drugs but that he did not control any participants in his drug activities. He 
contends that these actions are insufficient to qualify as a leader, manager, organizer, 
                                                                                                                           
Q. Did you have any other drug transactions with Angel 
Amaya? 
A. We did one.  We didn’t make any profit, so then we 
couldn’t do any more.  Oh.  I did bring drugs to another 
guy.  His name is Gilberto Apolonio. 
Q. Based on your conversations with either Angel 
Amaya or Gilberto Apolonio, do you know if those two 
were also involved in drug trafficking together? 
A. Yes. 
Q. How do you know that? 
A. Because some of those six ounces that I brought were 
flushed through the toilet and they were not paid for and 
Angel Amaya told me that Gilberto was the one that flushed 
them through the toilet. 
Trial Tr. at 433-34.  From this record, the circumstances of Deanda’s delivery of drugs 
to Apolonio are entirely unknown.  I am left to speculate about how Deanda came to 
deliver drugs to Apolonio, and whether the drugs were for Apolonio’s personal use or 
resale. The paucity of information regarding Apolonio’s involvement with drugs is 
insufficient for me to find that he was a participant in the charged drug conspiracy. 
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or supervisor.  I agree.  Federal courts of appeals have held that “being a buyer and 
seller of illegal drugs, even in league with more than five or more other persons, does 
not establish that a defendant has functioned as an ‘organizer, leader, manager or 
supervisor’ of criminal activity.” United States v. Sayles, 296 F.3d 219, 225 (4th Cir. 
2002); see also United States v. Slade, 631 F.3d 185, 190 (4th Cir. 2011) (same, 
quoting Sayles, 296 F.3d at 225); United States v. Betancourt, 422 F.3d 240, 245 (5th 
Cir. 2005) (accepting “the proposition from Sayles” that the prosecution  must show 
more than that defendant was a buyer and seller of illegal drugs to qualify as an 
organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor); United States v. Schuh, 289 F.3d 968, 973 
(7th Cir. 2002) (holding that defendant’s actions as a middleman for drug transaction 
was insufficient for a § 3B1.1 adjustment); United States v. Graham, 162 F.3d 1180, 
1183-84 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (holding that “the mere act of directing buyers to sellers does 
not constitute management or supervision warranting an enhancement.”); United States 
v. Glinton, 154 F.3d 1245, 1260 (11th Cir. 1998) (holding that “[a] mere buyer/seller 
relationship is not a sufficient basis to assess a managerial enhancement.”); United 
States v. Belletiere, 971 F.2d 961, 970 (3d Cir. 1992) (observing that “[w]here an 
individual is convicted of a series of solitary, non-related crimes, such as a series of 
drug sales by one drug seller to various buyers, and there is no ‘organization’ or 
‘scheme’ between the drug seller and buyers, or between the buyers themselves, that 
the defendant could be said to have ‘led’ or ‘organized,’ section 3B1.1 cannot apply.”). 
Thus, I conclude that the prosecution has not proven by a preponderance of the 
evidence that a three or four level adjustment is warranted for Amaya’s role in the drug 
conspiracy.  However, for the reasons discussed above, I conclude that a two-level 
managerial role enhancement applies to Amaya for his role in the money laundering 
conspiracy.  Amaya’s objection to this portion of the PSR is sustained in part and 
denied in part. 
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b. Using a minor 
Amaya also objects to the PSR’s recommendation that he receive a two-level 
increase under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.4 for using or attempting to use a minor, Apolonio, to 
commit the money laundering offense.  See PSR at ¶ 22.  Section 3B1.4 states:  “If the 
defendant used or attempted to use a person less than eighteen years of age to commit 
the offense or assist in avoiding detection of, or apprehension for, the offense, increase 
by 2 levels.”  U.S.S.G. § 3B1.4.  Application Note 1 states:  “‘Used or attempted to 
use’ includes directing, commanding, encouraging, intimidating, counseling, training, 
procuring, recruiting, or soliciting.”  U.S.S.G. § 3B1.4, cmt. n.1.  For this 
enhancement to apply, “the defendant must affirmatively involve or incorporate the 
minor into the commission of the offense[.]”  United States v. Mentzos, 462 F.3d 830, 
841 (8th Cir. 2006) (citing United States. v. Paine, 407 F.3d 958, 965 (8th Cir. 2005)). 
“‘Used or attempted to use’ does not [. . . ] require active involvement on behalf of the 
minor.” Paine, 407 F.3d at 965; see United States v. Castro-Hernandez, 258 F.3d 
1057, 1060 (9th Cir. 2001) (“It is sufficient that the defendant took affirmative steps to 
involve the minor in a manner that furthered or was intended to further the commission 
of the offense.”).  “‘The unambiguous legislative design of [§] 3B1.4 is to protect 
minors as a class from being “solicited, procured, recruited, counseled, encouraged, 
trained, directed, commanded, intimidated, or otherwise used” to commit crime.’” 
Paine, 407 F.3d at 965 (quoting United States v. McClain, 252 F.3d 1279, 1286 (11th 
Cir. 2001)).  “Among other things, a defendant may ‘use’ a minor by asking the minor 
to accompany him or her to a crime.”  United States v. Voegtlin, 437 F.3d 741, 747 
(8th Cir. 2006); see also Paine, 407 F.3d at 965 (holding that “asking [the defendant’s] 
son to accompany him on the robbery because he would not otherwise have had the 
courage to commit the crime” is sufficient “use” of a minor to apply § 3B1.4). 
Case 5:11-cr-04065-MWB   Document 513   Filed 06/11/13   Page 18 of 46
19 
 
Amaya brought Apolonio along on the trip to California, paying for Apolonio’s 
plane tickets.  During this trip, Amaya had funds withdrawn from a bank account in 
Apolonio’s name to make a payment on a drug debt.  I conclude from these actions that 
Amaya brought Apolonio along on the trip, at minimum, to assist in avoiding the 
detection of his money laundering activities.  Accordingly, I find that there is sufficient 
evidence in the record for me to reasonably find that Amaya used a minor to avoid 
detection of the money laundering offense and the two-level increase under § 3B1.4 is 
appropriate.  Amaya’s objection to this portion of the PSR is denied. 
c. Obstruction of justice 
Amaya also objects to the PSR’s recommendation that he receive a two-level 
increase for obstruction of justice under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1.  See PSR at ¶ 15.  This 
recommendation is based on Amaya’s posting of the “Government’s Amended Witness 
List,” which he labeled a “snitch list,” on his internet Facebook page, and a response 
Amaya made to a comment on Facebook after the list was posted.10  See Prosecution 
Ex. 5.  Amaya contends that his posting of the witness list was not done to intimidate 
any witness and points out that the witness list was not sealed.  He argues that he was 
compelled to post the list to refute rumors in the community that he was cooperating 
with law enforcement, and to prove that he was taking his case to trial.  Defendant’s 
Objections at 4.  
The prosecution argues that Amaya’s true intention in posting the witness list is 
demonstrated by the fact that Amaya labeled it a “snitch list” and he could have 
accomplished his stated goal, refuting rumors of his cooperation, without posting the 
list.  The prosecution also points to Amaya’s response to a comment on Facebook as 
                                       
10 “A snitch is a negative slang term offenders use to describe an informant.”  
United States v. Galaviz, 687 F.3d 1042, 1044 n.1 (8th Cir. 2012) (Smith, J., 
dissenting) (citing White v. Fox, 470 Fed. App’x 214, 220–21 (5th Cir. 2012)). 
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evidencing Amaya’s intention when he posted the witness list.  After Amaya posted the 
witness list, a third party commented “fucken tavo thats [sic] fucked up homie”.  
Prosecution Ex. 5.  Tavo is Octavio Noris’s nickname.  In response, Amaya wrote:  
“what can i [sic] say rats are rats”.  Prosecution Ex. 5. 
  The prosecution also argues that an obstruction of justice enhancement is 
warranted because, while on house arrest prior to trial, Amaya had a third party make 
contact with witness Ana Cortes’s husband, and request that he visit Amaya’s home.  
When Cortes’s husband did so, Amaya told him that if Cortes testified at Amaya’s trial, 
Amaya wasn’t going to go down alone and that he would take everyone with him, 
including Cortes.  Amaya responds that he and Cortes’s husband were long-time friends 
and that he was merely venting during the course of a conversation with his friend.  
Amaya argues that his comment was not meant to scare or intimidate Cortes. 
Section 3C1.1 provides: 
If (1) the defendant willfully obstructed or impeded, or 
attempted to obstruct or impede, the administration of justice 
with respect to the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing 
of the instant offense of conviction, and (2) the obstructive 
conduct related to (A) the defendant’s offense of conviction 
and any relevant conduct; or (B) a closely related offense, 
increase the offense level by 2 levels. 
U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1.  
Section 3C1.1 requires “willful” obstruction of justice.  See United States v. 
Petrovic, 701 F.3d 849, 859 (8th Cir. 2012); United States v. Boesen, 541 F.3d 838, 
851 (8th Cir. 2008); United States v. Whiting, 522 F.3d 845, 850 (8th Cir. 2008.  
However, “some conduct simply is obstruction of justice regardless of the effects the 
actor intended or expected.  United States v. Wahlstrom, 588 F.3d 538, 545 (8th Cir. 
2009) (emphasis original) (citing United States v. Cassiliano, 137 F.3d 742, 747 (2d 
Cir. 1998)).  For example, “[a]ttempting to harm a prosecutor's family member is ‘so 
Case 5:11-cr-04065-MWB   Document 513   Filed 06/11/13   Page 20 of 46
21 
 
inherently obstructive of the administration of justice that the enhancement should be 
applied if the defendant deliberately engaged in that conduct, regardless of [his or] her 
specific purpose.’” Wahlstrom, 588 F.3d at 545 (quoting Cassiliano, 137 F.3d at 747) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)).   
“‘A district court must find the predicate facts supporting such an enhancement 
for obstruction of justice by a preponderance of the evidence.’”  United States v. 
Walker, 688 F.3d 416, 425 (8th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Alvarado, 615 
F.3d 916, 922 (8th Cir. 2010); see Petrovic, 701 F.3d at 759; Boesen, 541 F.3d at 851; 
United States v. Tyndall, 521 F.3d 877, 882 (8th Cir. 2008).  The Eighth Circuit Court 
of Appeals has instructed that, “[a]n attempt to intimidate or threaten a witness, even if 
unsuccessful, is sufficient to sustain a two-level enhancement for obstruction of 
justice.”  United States v. Carrillo, 380 F.3d 411, 415 (8th Cir. 2004) (quotations and 
citations omitted); see United States v. Vickers, 528 F.3d 1116, 1121 (8th Cir. 2008) 
(holding that defendant’s attempt “to induce witnesses to change their stories through 
threats and offers of payment” supported obstruction of justice enhancement); United 
States v. Carrillo, 380 F.3d 411, 414 (8th Cir. 2004) (“‘An attempt to intimidate or 
threaten a witness, even if unsuccessful, is sufficient to sustain a two-level enhancement 
for obstruction of justice.’”) (quoting United States v. Vaca, 289 F.3d 1046, 1049 (8th 
Cir. 2002) (quoting in turn United States v. Thompson, 210 F.3d 855, 861 (8th Cir. 
2000) (quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Davis, 357 F.3d 726, 729 (8th Cir. 
2004) (holding two-level adjustment warranted for threatening witnesses, as such 
threats were “calculated to impede a criminal investigation and therefore constituted an 
obstruction of justice”), rev’d on other grounds, 543 U.S. 1099 (2005).  Moreover, 
“[t]he language of § 3C1.1 is broad, and as the commentary recognizes, ‘[o]bstructive 
conduct can vary widely in nature, degree of planning, and seriousness.’” Wahlstrom, 
588 F.3d at 544 (quoting U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 cmt. n.3).  The commentary to the 
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guideline provides a nonexhaustive list of the types of conduct to which the adjustment 
applies, including “threatening, intimidating, or otherwise unlawfully influencing a co-
defendant, witness or juror, directly or indirectly, or attempting to do so.”  U.S.S.G. § 
3C1.1 cmt. n.4(a). 
 The possible obstruction of justice enhancement, for Amaya posting the 
prosecution’s witness list, raises the issue of whether such conduct is protected by the 
First Amendment.  The First Amendment provides “Congress shall make no law . . . 
abridging the freedom of speech.”  U.S. CONST. amend. I.  “‘[T]he First Amendment 
means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its 
ideas, its subject matter, or its content.’” United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 
2543 (2012) (quoting Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union, 535 U.S. 564, 573 
(2002)).  “There is ‘no First Amendment right to make intimidating threats against 
government witnesses.’” United States v. Judd, 315 Fed. App’x 35, 39 (10th Cir. 
2008) (quoting United States v. Jackson, 974 F.2d 104, 106 (9th Cir.1992) (citing in 
turn United States v. Shoulberg, 895 F.2d 882, 886 (2d Cir.1990)).  This is because 
“true threats” are not protected by the First Amendment.  See Virginia v. Black, 538 
U.S. 343, 359 (2003); Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707 (1969); D.J.M. ex. 
rel. D.M. v. Hannibal Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 60, 647 F.3d 754, 764 (8th Cir. 2011); 
Riehm v. Engelking, 538 F.3d 952, 963 (8th Cir. 2008); see also United States v. 
Koschuk, 480 Fed. App’x 616, 617 (2nd Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 902 
(2013); United States v. White, 670 F.3d 498, 526 (4th Cir. 2012); United States v. 
Stewart, 420 F.3d 1007, 1016 (9th Cir. 2005); United States v. Nishnianidze, 342 F.3d 
6, 16 (1st Cir. 2003); United States v. Landham, 251 F.3d 1072, 1080 (6th Cir. 2001).  
“True threats” constitute one of the “well-defined and narrowly limited classes of 
speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any 
Constitutional problem.” Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942); 
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see Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2544 (recognizing that true threats are one of the few 
“‘historic and traditional categories [of expression]’” in which content-based 
restrictions on speech is permitted); United States v. Williams, 690 F.3d 1056, 1061 
(8th Cir. 2012) (noting that true threats are one of the “discrete categories of content-
based restrictions on speech” permitted under the First Amendment). 
“‘True threats’ encompass those statements where the speaker means to 
communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to 
a particular individual or group of individuals.”  Black, 538 U.S. at 359; see United 
States v. Mabie, 663 F.3d 322, 330 (8th Cir. 2011) (“A ‘true threat’ is defined as a 
‘statement that a reasonable recipient would have interpreted as a serious expression of 
an intent to harm or cause injury to another.’” (quoting Doe v. Pulaski Cnty. Special 
Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d 616, 624 (8th Cir. 2002) (en banc)).  The “prohibition on true 
threats protects individuals from the fear of violence and from the disruption that fear 
engenders, in addition to protecting people from the possibility that the threatened 
violence will occur.” Id. at 360 (internal quotations omitted).  A “true threat” is 
“determined from the point of view of a reasonable recipient.”  Williams, 690 F.3d at 
1062; see Mabie, 663 F.3d at 330-31; United States v. Beale, 620 F.3d 856, 865 (8th 
Cir. 2010); Doe, 306 F.3d at 624.  
The “true threat” doctrine originated in Watts, where the petitioner appealed his 
conviction for violating 18 U.S.C. § 871, which prohibits any person from “knowingly 
and willfully . . . [making] any threat to take the life of or to inflict bodily harm upon 
the President of the United States.”  Watts, 394 U.S. at 705–05.  The petitioner’s 
conviction was based on the following statement made by Watts, during an anti-
Vietnam War rally:  “They always holler at us to get an education. And now I have 
already received my draft classification as 1–A and I have got to report for my physical 
this Monday coming.  I am not going.  If they ever make me carry a rifle the first man 
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I want to get in my sights is L.B.J.”  Id. at 706.  The Supreme Court reversed, 
concluding that the petitioner’s speech was not a “true threat.”  After recognizing the 
nation’s valid, “even overwhelming,” interest in the President’s life, the Court 
observed: 
Nevertheless, a statute such as this one, which makes 
criminal a form of pure speech, must be interpreted with the 
commands of the First Amendment clearly in mind. What is 
a threat must be distinguished from what is constitutionally 
protected speech. 
Id. at 707.  The Court went on to hold that, “‘against the background of a profound 
national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, 
robust, and wideopen, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes 
unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials,’” id. at 708 (citation 
omitted),  the petitioner’s speech did not rise to the level of “true threat” and was thus 
protected by the First Amendment.  Id. 
The terms “snitch” and “rat,” as used by Amaya to describe prosecution 
witnesses, generally carries a negative connotation.  The following first sentence of a 
law review article succinctly summarizes the connotation of these words: 
“To mobsters, he is a ‘rat’; to drug dealers, a ‘snitch.’ To 
school children, he is a ‘tattletale’; to corporate executives, 
a ‘whistle-blower.’ To cops, he is an ‘informant’; to 
prosecutors, a ‘cooperator.’ By whatever name he is known, 
the person who betrays his associates to the authorities is 
almost universally reviled. In movies, on television, in 
literature, the cooperator embodies all that society holds in 
contempt:  he is disloyal, deceitful, greedy, selfish, and 
weak.” 
Michael A. Simons, Retribution for Rats:  Cooperation, Punishment, and Atonement, 
56 VAND. L. REV. 1, 2 (2003).  The First Amendment, however, does not prohibit 
name-calling.  See Wright v. South Ark. Reg’l Health Ctr., Inc., 800 F.2d 199, 204 
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(8th Cir. 1996).  The First Amendment protects “vehement, caustic, and sometimes 
unpleasantly sharp attacks” as well as language that is “vituperative, abusive, and 
inexact.” Watts, 394 U.S. at 708.  Further, the First Amendment protects such speech 
even though “it may embarrass others or coerce them into action.”  NAACP v. 
Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 910 (1982).  Thus, “threats of vilification or 
social ostracism” are protected by the First Amendment.  Id.  It is only when speech 
crosses the line separating insults from “true threats” that it loses its First Amendment 
protection.  Amaya’s posting of the prosecution’s witness list does not cross that line. 
I find that Amaya never intended to, directly or indirectly, intimidate or 
influence any witness by this posting.  I base my conclusion on several facts.  The 
posting contains no explicit or implicit threats to any of the witnesses.  Other than 
Amaya’s “snitch list” editorialization, the posting contains no pejorative comments 
about the witnesses.  Rather, the posting is otherwise factually accurate, providing an 
unedited list of the prosecution’s witnesses against Amaya.  Significantly, Amaya did 
not tell any witness about the posting or otherwise direct their attention to it.   Amaya’s 
conduct, in merely posting the witness list, pales in comparison to the conduct courts 
have found sufficient to warrant a sentence enhancement for obstruction of justice.  See 
United States v. Lindsey, 123 F.3d 978 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding two level increase for 
obstruction of justice appropriate where defendant distributed a “wanted” poster 
containing a picture of witness and defendant’s offer of money to any who would beat 
up the witness); see also United States v. Little,  472 Fed. App’x 129, 132 (3rd Cir. 
2012) (holding defendant’s conduct in writing letter to the mother of one of his co-
conspirator’s children in which he “implicitly threatened the co-conspirator with harm, 
warning that ‘snitches die slow’” supported a two level increase for obstruction of 
justice); United States v. Jackson, 974 F.2d 104, 105 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding two level 
increase for obstruction of justice appropriate where defendant wrote “The ‘Rat’ Fred 
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Pittman” and “Snitch” on witness’s cooperation agreement, gave copies of the 
cooperation agreement to others, and circulated copies of it at a restaurant and 
nightclub, intending his actions would “[chill] potential witnesses’ willingness to 
cooperate with the government. . .”).  Thus, I find the posting of the witness list was 
not a “true threat,” as such, it is protected by the First Amendment, and does not 
warrant an obstruction of justice enhancement. 
I note that Amaya had every right to investigate the prosecution’s witnesses and 
to seek witnesses or information he could use on his own behalf at trial.  The 
prosecution has a virtually unlimited budget with which to investigate and prosecute its 
cases.  In comparison, most defendants have very limited resources at their disposal.  
Private investigators are largely unavailable, and, even when available, the resources 
available to the typical defendant do not compare to those the prosecution can bring to 
bear.  A social media website such as Facebook offers a defendant an affordable, easy, 
and extremely viable option to seek information to employ in his or her defense.  The 
posting by Amaya of the witness list was just such a use.           
I similarly conclude that Amaya never intended to intimidate or influence Ana 
Cortes by his comment to her husband.  The situation here is similar to United States v. 
Hernandez, 83 F.3d 582, 585–86 (2d Cir. 1996).  In Hernandez, the defendant spoke to 
to a cooperating witness before trial, calling her “the devil,” and said she would “stare 
[the witness] down” at trial.  Id. at 585.  The Second Circuit Court of Appeals held the 
district court’s finding of obstructive intent clearly erroneous, even though the witness 
was “scared.”  Id.  The court of appeals found the statement was not a threat but was 
merely an expression of a feeling of betrayal, observing that “[f]’ury may be 
exceedingly unpleasant, but alone, it bespeaks no intent to obstruct justice.”  Id. at 586.  
Like the defendant in Hernandez, I find that Amaya’s statement to Cortes’s husband 
was merely his frustrated venting about the circumstances in which he found himself 
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and was not made with any intent to obstruct justice.  I recognize that “[a] defendant 
can attempt to influence a witness indirectly by asking a third party to threaten or 
communicate with the witness.”  United States v. Fleming, 667 F.3d 1098, 1109-10 
(10th Cir. 2011).  Here, however, Amaya never asked Cortes’s husband to relay his 
message to Cortes.  Indeed, Amaya never asked Cortes’s husband to relay any 
information or statement to her.  Moreover, Amaya’s reference “to taking everybody 
with him”, could not have been threatening to Cortes since she was already a witness 
for the prosecution.  Thus, I am unpersuaded that Amaya had the requisite intent to 
obstruct justice when he made his statement to Cortes’s husband and will not impose an 
obstruction of justice enhancement under § 3C1.1.  Amaya’s objection to this portion of 
the PSR is sustained. 
d. Acceptance of responsibility 
Amaya also objects to the PSR’s recommendation that he not receive a two-level 
reduction for acceptance of responsibility under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1.  See PSR at ¶ 16.  
Amaya argues that he went through with the third trial in order to preserve his claim 
that the Fifth Amendment’s double jeopardy clause barred his retrial because the 
prosecutor's conduct was intended to ‘goad’ him into moving for a mistrial.  See 
Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 673 (1982); Garrison v. Burt, 637 F.3d 849, 853 
(8th Cir. 2011).  In response, the prosecution argues that Amaya does not qualify for 
acceptance of responsibility because he has put the prosecution to its burden of proof at 
trial, and expressed remorse for his actions only after being convicted.  The prosecution 
also argues that Amaya does not qualify for acceptance of responsibility because he has 
obstructed justice.       
Section 3E1.1(a) permits a sentencing court to reduce a defendant's offense level 
by two “[i]f the defendant clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility for his 
offense.”  Amaya bears the burden of demonstrating that he is entitled to a reduction 
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for his acceptance of responsibility.  See United States v. Daniels, 625 F.3d 529, 534 
(8th Cir. 2010); United States v. Wallenfang, 568 F.3d 649, 661 (8th Cir. 2009); 
United States v. Herron, 539 F.3d 881, 887-88 (8th Cir. 2008).  “‘Whether the 
defendant accepted responsibility is a factual question that depends largely on credibility 
assessments made by the sentencing court.’”  United States v. Ayala, 610 F.3d 1035, 
1036 (8th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Long Soldier, 431 F.3d 1120, 1122-23 
(8th Cir. 2005)). 
The prosecution contends that Amaya’s obstruction of justice precludes him from 
receiving a reduction for acceptance of responsibility.  The Eighth Circuit Court of 
Appeals has held that a defendant guilty of obstructing justice may only receive a 
downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility in “extraordinary case[s].” 
United States v. Honken, 184 F.3d 961, 967 (8th Cir.1999); see United States v. 
Walker, 688 F.3d 416, 426 (8th Cir. 2012); United States v. Godsey, 690 F.3d 906, 
911 (8th Cir. 2012); United States v. Jones, 612 F.3d 1040, 1047 (8th Cir. 2010).  
However, I have found that Amaya did not obstruct justice.  Therefore, this line of 
authorities does not bar Amaya from receiving a reduction for acceptance of 
responsibility.   
Amaya elected to proceed to trial. The commentary accompanying § 3E1.1 
explains that: 
This adjustment is not intended to apply to a 
defendant who puts the government to its burden of proof at 
trial by denying the essential factual elements of guilt, is 
convicted, and only then admits guilt and expresses remorse. 
Conviction by trial, however, does not automatically 
preclude a defendant from consideration for such a 
reduction. In rare situations a defendant may clearly 
demonstrate an acceptance of responsibility for his criminal 
conduct even though he exercises his constitutional right to a 
trial. This may occur, for example, where a defendant goes 
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to trial to assert and preserve issues that do not relate to 
factual guilt (e.g., to make a constitutional challenge to a 
statute or a challenge to the applicability of a statute to his 
conduct). In each such instance, however, a determination 
that a defendant has accepted responsibility will be based 
primarily upon pre-trial statements and conduct. 
U.S.S.G § 3E1.1 cmt. n. 2.  
Amaya argues that this is the “rare situation” where he is entitled to a reduction 
for acceptance of responsibility in spite of the fact that he proceeded to trial and put the 
prosecution to its proof.  Amaya argues that he had to go to trial to preserve his double 
jeopardy argument for appeal.  This argument fails for two reasons.  First, this 
argument does not explain why he went to trial initially.  Second, Amaya had an 
alternative means to preserving his double jeopardy argument which did not require him 
to go to trial.  He possibly could have entered a conditional guilty plea, pursuant to 
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(a)(2), reserving the right to raise his double 
jeopardy claim on appeal.11  Amaya never attempted to do so, and has not demonstrated 
that he was precluded from doing so.  Under these circumstances, Amaya has not 
proven he is entitled to an acceptance of responsibility reduction.  See United States v. 
Cordero, 465 F.3d 626, 632 (5th Cir. 2006) (affirming denial of acceptance of 
responsibility where defendant failed to show that he could not have entered a 
conditional guilty plea to preserve for appeal issues raised in his pretrial motions).  
Amaya’s objection to this portion of the PSR is denied. 
                                       
11Rule 11(a)(2) provides that: “With the consent of the court and the 
government, a defendant may enter a conditional plea of guilty or nolo contendere, 
reserving in writing the right to have an appellate court review an adverse 
determination of a specified pretrial motion.  A defendant who prevails on appeal may 
then withdraw the plea.” 
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2. Offense level computation 
I find that the charged drug conspiracy involved at least 10,000 kilograms but 
less than 30,000 kilograms of marijuana equivalent.  Thus, I find, pursuant to U.S.S.G. 
§ 2D1.1, that Amaya’s base offense level is 36.12  I next examine the potential offense 
level adjustments and enhancements.  I find that, pursuant to U.S.S.G. 
§ 2S1.1(b)(2)(B), Amaya qualifies for a two point enhancement because of his money 
laundering conviction.  I also find that, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.4, Amaya qualifies 
for a two point enhancement for using a minor to commit the offense.  I further find 
that, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c), Amaya qualifies for a two point enhancement 
because he was an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor of the money laundering 
conspiracy.  Thus, Amaya’s adjusted offense level is 42.  The parties agree, and I find, 
that Amaya’s criminal history category is I, with one criminal history point for a state 
conviction for driving while barred.  Amaya’s advisory guideline sentence is 360 
months to life. 
 
C. Step 2—Determination Of Whether To Depart 
In the second step of the sentencing methodology, I determine whether any 
traditional “departure” is appropriate, see United States v. Washington, 515 F.3d 861, 
866 (8th Cir. 2008), that is, whether there are features of Amaya’s case that potentially 
take it outside the Guidelines “heartland” and make it a special or unusual case 
warranting a departure, see United States v. Chase, 451 F.3d 474, 482 (8th Cir. 2006); 
U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0; id. § 1A1.1, cmt. (n.4(b)).  
                                       
12 The guideline for money laundering offenses, U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1, directs using 
the offense level for the underlying offense from which the laundered funds were 
derived.  In this case, the underlying drug offense is the drug conspiracy, which 
pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1, establishes an offense level of 36 based on 10,000 
kilograms to 30,000 kilograms of marijuana equivalent.     
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The prosecution has not sought an upward departure, and Amaya has not sought 
a downward departure. I do not believe that there are any sound bases for either a 
traditional upward or downward departure, that is, that there are features of Amaya’s 
case that potentially take it outside the Guidelines “heartland” and make it a special or 
unusual case warranting a departure provided for in Chapter Five or § 4A1.3 of the 
Guidelines.  Therefore, I find no departures are warranted.  
 
D. Step 3—Application Of The § 3553(a) Factors  
1. Overview of § 3553(a) factors 
The third step in the sentencing methodology requires that I apply the § 3553(a) 
factors to determine whether to impose a guideline or non-guideline sentence. The 
prosecution argues that application of the § 3553(a) factors does not warrant a 
downward variance for Amaya.  I disagree.  Section 3553(a) lists the following factors: 
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the 
history and characteristics of the defendant; (2) the need for 
the sentence imposed—(A) to reflect the seriousness of the 
offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just 
punishment for the offense; (B) to afford adequate 
deterrence to criminal conduct; (C) to protect the public 
from further crimes of the defendant; and (D) to provide the 
defendant with needed educational or vocational training, 
medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most 
effective manner; (3) the kinds of sentences available; (4) 
the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range established 
for—(A) the applicable category of offense committed by the 
applicable category of defendant as set forth in the 
guidelines . . . (5) any pertinent policy statement . . . issued 
by the Sentencing Commission . . .; (6) the need to avoid 
unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with 
similar records who have been found guilty of similar 
conduct; and (7) the need to provide restitution to any 
victims of the offense. 
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18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1)-(7) (line breaks omitted).   
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has held “[t]he district court has wide 
latitude to weigh the § 3553(a) factors in each case and assign some factors greater 
weight than others in determining an appropriate sentence.”  United States v. Bridges, 
569 F.3d 374, 379 (8th Cir. 2009); see United States v. Chaika, 695 F.3d 741, 746 
(8th Cir. 2012).  In considering the § 3553(a) factors, “[a] district court is not required 
to recite each of the sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), as long as the 
record makes clear that they were considered.”  United States v. Powills, 537 F.3d 
947, 950 (8th Cir. 2008); see United States v. Gasaway, 684 F.3d 804, 807-08 (8th 
Cir. 2012) (“‘The district court is presumed to know the law in regard to sentencing 
and need not recite each factor to be upheld. When we review the § 3553(a) factors, we 
will look to the entire record.’”) (quoting United States v. Keating, 579 F.3d 891, 893 
(8th Cir. 2009) (internal citation omitted)).  Nevertheless, I will expressly consider 
each of the § 3553(a) factors in turn. 
2. Nature and circumstances of the offense 
The first § 3553(a) factor requires me to consider the nature and circumstances 
of the offense.  18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1).  As Amaya readily admits in his brief, he was 
a “drug dealer.”  Defendant’s Br. at 9.  At trial, the prosecution presented the 
testimony of twenty witnesses.  Brendan Uhl, Dan Wenzel, Shawn Forbes, Rafael 
Munoz, Scott Dwyer, Didier Cancino-Torres, Luis Eduardo Deanda, Octavio Noris, 
and Jorge Aguilar all testified to their personal involvement with Amaya in various 
aspects of his drug trafficking activities.  The testimony of these cooperators was 
corroborated by circumstantial evidence of phone records; drug pay/owe sheets; a 
recorded conversation between co-conspirator Deanda and Amaya discussing a 
contemplated drug transaction; evidence of transfers of funds in payment for drugs; and 
the interception of a shipment of marijuana.  
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On February 15, 2011, Didier Cancino-Torres was arrested following a 
controlled drug buy in which he was the source of the methamphetamine involved in the 
transaction.  On March 2, 2011, Cancino-Torres participated in a proffer with law 
enforcement officers.  During this proffer, Cancino-Torres identified “Angel” as his 
source of methamphetamine.  Cancino-Torres later identified Amaya as being “Angel.”  
Cancino-Torres testified at trial to receiving a total of approximately three kilograms of 
methamphetamine from Amaya.  “Pay/owe” sheets recovered from Amaya’s trash, and 
introduced as evidence at his trial, indicated that Cancino-Torres owed Amaya $48,000.   
Amaya’s price to Cancino-Torres for one pound of methamphetamine was $23,000.  
Shawn Forbes delivered six ounces of cocaine to Amaya.  Amaya also obtained 
methamphetamine and marijuana from Forbes. Rafael Munoz bought cocaine from 
cocaine from Amaya and, at one point, saw Amaya with a kilo of cocaine.  Jorge 
Aguilar bought marijuana from Amaya.  Scott Dwyer purchased methamphetamine 
from Amaya several times, buying two to four ounces each time.  Dan Wenzel bought 
marijuana and cocaine from Amaya.  He estimates that he bought between forty and six 
pounds of marijuana from Amaya.  Amaya would front Wenzel the drugs and Wenzel 
would pay Amaya after he sold them.  Brandon Uhl arranged drug sales between 
Amaya and persons he knew were looking to purchase marijuana. Similarly, Luis 
Eduardo Deanda obtained drugs from Amaya and split the profits with Amaya after 
Deanda sold them.     
The evidence at trial also established that Amaya arranged for the transportation 
of methamphetamine, cocaine, and marijuana from California and Texas to Iowa.  
Amaya would then distribute the drugs in the Sioux City area using a network of 
friends and associates.  Amaya, through Joseph Meyer, asked Brandon Uhl to provide 
addresses for the drug deliveries.  Uhl gave Amaya his own address, his “baby’s 
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mother’s” address, and the address of an ex-roommate of his baby’s mother.  The third 
shipment, from California, was intercepted by law enforcement agents.     
As a direct offshoot of his drug activities, Amaya also engaged in a conspiracy to 
launder his drug trafficking proceeds. As part of this money laundering conspiracy,  
Amaya either deposited or directed others to deposit drug proceeds into at least ten 
different bank accounts.  Amaya provided the money, between $6,000 and $8,000, for 
the deposits.  On at least two occasions, Amaya directed individuals to open a new 
account into which they would deposit drug proceeds.  On one such occasion, Javier 
Amaya gave his personal information to a teller at a Wells Fargo branch bank in Sioux 
City, Iowa, to open an account and Amaya gave the teller the money to open the 
account.  When the teller asked where the money came from, Amaya replied, “Don’t 
ask, you don’t want to know.”   Ann Cortes, in her position as a bank teller, deposited 
money for Amaya several times into bank accounts which were not in Amaya’s name.  
Also in furtherance of his money laundering activities, Amaya, along with Javier 
Amaya, Jorge Aguilar, and Apolonio, traveled to California, at Amaya’s expense.  The 
group went the day after bank deposits were made in Sioux City.  Then, while in 
California, Amaya and Aguilar withdrew money from one account at essentially the 
same time that Javier Amaya withdrew money from the Sioux City account he had 
opened. 
Drug distribution and money laundering are undoubtedly serious crimes. See 
City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 42 (2000) (“There is no doubt that traffic 
in illegal narcotics creates social harms of the first magnitude.”). Methamphetamine 
and cocaine are highly addictive, and drug transactions involving them are associated 
with gangs, guns, and violence.  See United States v. Bustos-Torres, 396 F.3d 935, 943 
(8th Cir. 2005) (observing that “weapons and violence are frequently associated with 
drug transactions. . .”).  However, there are varying levels of participation and 
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blameworthiness in any drug distribution scheme.  Unlike the defendant in United 
States v. Newhouse, ___ F. Supp.2d ___, 2013 WL 346432, at *1 (Jan. 30, 2013), to 
whom I recently granted a substantial downward variance, Amaya is not a mere pill 
smurfer, a low-level, non-violent drug addict engaged in the drug trade to obtain drugs 
to feed an addiction.  Amaya’s role was several rungs up the ladder from the drug 
smurfer.  While clearly occupying a position above a drug smurf, Amaya was by no 
means a drug kingpin.  Rather, he was, at best, a mid-level distributor.   
A substantially mitigating circumstance in this case is that there is not a shred of 
evidence indicating that Amaya’s participation in these crimes involved any violence.  
Notably, while courts have recognized many times that guns are tools of the drug trade, 
see United States v. Jordan, 260 F.3d 930 (8th Cir. 2001); Lyons v. Robinson, 783 
F.2d 737, 739 (8th Cir. 1995) see also United States v. Fife,624 F.3d 441, 447 (7th 
Cir. 2010);United States v. Vaughn, 585 F.3d 1024, 1029 (7th Cir. 2009); United 
States v. Hardin, 248 F.3d 489, 499 (6th Cir. 2001); United States v. McKissick, 204 
F.3d 1282, 1293 (10th Cir. 2000); United States v. Ward, 171 F.3d 188, 195 (4th Cir. 
1999); United States v. Russell, 134 F.3d 171, 183 (3d Cir. 1998); United States v. 
Westbrook, 119 F.3d 1176, 1193 (5th Cir. 1997); United States v. Martinez, 938 F.2d 
1078, 1083-84 (10th Cir. 1991); United States v. Martin, 794 F.2d 1531, 1533 (11th 
Cir. 1986), there is no evidence that Amaya ever possessed a gun, or any other 
weapon.  Likewise, while gang membership has been found to be associated with 
violence in the drug trade, see, e.g., United States v. Williams, 81 F.3d 1434, 1437 
(7th Cir. 1996) (noting that El Rukn gang members “committed many murders, and 
engaged in much other violence, in the turf wars that are endemic to the trade in illegal 
drugs.”), there is absolutely no evidence of any gang involvement by Amaya.         
Case 5:11-cr-04065-MWB   Document 513   Filed 06/11/13   Page 35 of 46
36 
 
3. Amaya’s history and characteristics 
The first § 3553(a) factor also requires that I consider “the history and 
characteristics of the defendant.”  18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1).  Amaya is 25 years old.     
He is one of five children.  His parents moved to the United States 25 years ago and are 
legal residents.  Amaya is a citizen of the United States. His parents reside in Sioux 
City, Iowa, and are employed.  His father is also a pastor in a local church.  Amaya’s 
parents have no prior arrests or substance abuse history.  Amaya has a good 
relationship with his parents.  Amaya’s four siblings all reside in Sioux City.  Neither 
of his two adult siblings abuse drugs or alcohol.  
 Amaya graduated from high school in 2005.  Since graduating, his employment 
history has been sporadic.  He has largely worked in construction, but has also done 
“odd jobs” and sold items on Craigslist.  He has four misdemeanor convictions:  
driving with a revoked license and contributing to the delinquency of a minor, when he 
was 19; driving while barred, at age 20; and failing to have a valid driver’s license, 
when he was 22. 
Amaya began drinking alcohol when he was 15 years old.  He has consumed 
alcohol daily since he was 20 years old.   When he was 18 years old, Amaya began 
smoking marijuana and using cocaine.  Since he was 22 years old, he used both 
marijuana and cocaine on a daily basis.  Amaya has never tried methamphetamine.  He 
has never been evaluated or treated for substance abuse.  Amaya has no history of 
mental or emotional health concerns.   There was no evidence at trial, and no indication 
in the PSR, that Amaya’s criminal conduct resulted from drug addiction.  I have no 
doubt that Amaya’s own drug use was the conduit that led to his involvement in the 
drug trade.  However, the advanced level of Amaya’s drug trafficking was not done 
merely to feed an addiction but appears to be the result of greed or at least a preference 
for making “easy money” dealing drugs rather than by working hard. 
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4. The need for the sentence imposed 
The second § 3553(a) factor is “the need for the sentence imposed,” 
§  3553(a)(2), including the need for the sentence “to reflect the seriousness of the 
offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the 
offense,” § 3553(a)(2)(A), “to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct,” 
§  3553(a)(2)(B), “to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant,” 
§  3553(a)(2)(C), and “to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational 
training” or other care or treatment, § 3553(a)(2)(D). 
A 360 month sentence at the low end of Amaya’s advisory guideline sentencing 
range is far greater than any of the sentences given to Amaya’s co-defendants.  Indeed, 
it is over six times longer than the sentences given to Noris, Aguilar, and Deanda 
combined.  Sentencing Amaya to such a disproportionate sentence, even when taking 
into account his greater role and culpability in the drug and money laundering 
conspiracies, would not promote respect for the law.  Quite the opposite, 
disproportionate, unduly harsh sentences breed disrespect for the law.  As the Supreme 
Court observed in Gall: 
a sentence of imprisonment may work to promote not 
respect, but derision, of the law if the law is viewed as 
merely a means to dispense harsh punishment without taking 
into account the real conduct and circumstances involved in 
sentencing. 
Gall, 552 U.S. at 54 (quoting with approval the reasoning of the district court); see also 
United States v. Deegan, 605 F.3d 625, 655 (8th Cir. 2010 (Bright, J., dissenting) 
(observing that harsh federal punishment when compared to lenient state sentencing for 
the same criminal activity “promotes disrespect for the law and the judicial system.”); 
United States v. Ontiveros, 07–CR–333, 2008 WL 2937539, at *3 (E.D. Wis. July 24, 
2008) (“[A] sentence that is disproportionately long in relation to the offense is unjust 
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and likewise fails to promote respect [for the law].”).  A 180 month sentence, while 
well below Amaya’s advisory guideline range, is still an extremely lengthy sentence 
and still much greater than the sentences given to all of Amaya’s co-defendants.  Such a 
sentence, however, is not grossly disproportionate when Amaya’s role and culpability 
are taken into account. 
I further find that a 180 month sentence is sufficient in length to reflect the 
seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law, provide just punishment, 
protect the public, and reflect the factors embodied in § 3553(a)(2).  I also find that a 
sentence within Amaya’s advisory guideline sentencing range of 360 months to life is 
greater than necessary to achieve the purposes set out in § 3553(a)(2). 
I further note the great disparity between the 360 month sentence at the low end 
of Amaya’s advisory guideline sentencing range and the sentences Amaya previously 
received.  See United States v. Qualls, 373 F. Supp. 2d 873, 877 (E.D. Wis. 2005) (“It 
is appropriate for a court, when considering the type of sentence necessary to protect 
the public and deter future misconduct, to note the length of any previous sentences 
imposed.”); see also United States v. Patzer, 548 F. Supp. 2d 612, 616-17 (N.D. Ill. 
2008) (considering the disparity between defendant’s guideline sentence in current case 
and defendant’s prior sentences in determining length of sentence required for 
deterrence and observing that “[c]ourts have noted that a large disparity between the 
punishment prescribed by the career criminal designation and the time served for prior 
offenses might indicate that the career criminal sentence is in excess of that needed to 
accomplish the desired deterrent effect).  The longest, and only, period of incarceration 
Amaya has previously served is one day on a 60 day state sentence for driving while 
barred.13 A 360 month sentence is an astounding 10,950 times longer than Amaya’s 
                                       
13Amaya’s other convictions resulted in only fines. 
Case 5:11-cr-04065-MWB   Document 513   Filed 06/11/13   Page 38 of 46
39 
 
longest previous sentence.  This incredibly large disparity is grossly in excess of that 
needed to accomplish deterrence.  Moreover, if Amaya is sentenced to 180 months 
imprisonment, he will be at least 38 years old when he is released.  The Sentencing 
Commission has found that recidivism rates decline relatively consistently as age 
increases. See U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, MEASURING RECIDIVISM: THE 
CRIMINAL HISTORY COMPUTATION OF THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES 12, ex. 
9 (2004).  I find that a 180 month sentence is sufficiently lengthy to protect the public 
from Amaya’s future crimes 
Finally, during a lengthy sentence, Amaya will have the opportunity to undergo 
extensive drug treatment in the Residential Drug Abuse Program (RDAP) and to take 
advantage of vocational training opportunities offered by the Bureau of Prisons.14  
Amaya has never undergone drug treatment but is willing to participate in the RDAP 
program. Amaya’s successful completion of drug treatment combined with new 
vocational skills would increase his employment possibilities upon release and 
substantially decrease the likelihood of his recidivism. 
5. The kinds of sentences available 
The third § 3553(a) factor is “the kinds of sentences available,” see 18 U.S.C. § 
3553(a)(3), and the fourth is “the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range 
                                                                                                                           
 
14 The RDAP program is an intensive drug treatment program where inmates live 
in separate housing and participate in half-day treatment and half-day school, work, or 
vocational programs.  Most inmates accepted into the RDAP spend nine months in the 
program.  See BUREAU OF PRISONS, Substance Abuse Treatment, 
http://bop.gov/inmate_programs/substance.jsp.  “Research findings demonstrated that 
RDAP participants are significantly less likely to recidivate and less likely to relapse to 
drug use than non-participants. The studies also suggest that the Bureau's RDAPs make 
a significant difference in the lives of inmates following their release from custody and 
return to the community.” Id. 
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established” for similar offenses.  18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4).  I have reviewed the 
sentencing options discussed in the PSR, including custody, supervised release, 
probation, fines, restitution, and denial of federal benefits.  PSR at 17-19.  In this case, 
the kinds of sentences available are largely circumscribed by the 120 month mandatory 
minimum sentence required by Amaya’s drug offense conviction.  See 21 U.S.C. 
§ 841(b)(1)(A).15   
6. Any pertinent policy statement 
The fifth § 3553(a) factor is “any pertinent policy statement.” 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3553(a)(5).  The parties have not directed me to any pertinent policy statement, or 
asked me to apply one, and I am unaware of any that apply. 
7. The need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparity 
The sixth § 3553(a) factor is “the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing 
disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of 
similar conduct.”  18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6).  In United States v. Beiermann, 599 F. 
Supp.2d 1087 (N.D. Iowa 2009), I noted that a concomitant of this principle is the need 
to avoid unwarranted similarities among defendants who are not similarly situated.  See 
Beiermann, 599 F. Supp. 2d at 1115-16 (citing Gall, 552 U.S. at 55, which recognizes 
the “need to avoid unwarranted similarities among other co-conspirators who were not 
similarly situated”). 
                                       
15Amaya did not raise a policy disagreement with the methamphetamine 
guidelines as an additional ground for a downward variance.  See United States v. 
Hayes, ___ F. Supp. ___, 2013 WL 2468038, at *20-22 (N.D. Iowa June 7, 2013) 
(granting downward variance based on my policy disagreements with the 
methamphetamine guidelines).  Even if defense counsel had raised this ground, it would 
not have resulted in a different sentence for Amaya.  
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The following chart compares the criminal histories, offense levels, sentencing 
ranges, and sentences received by the co-defendants in this case.16  
Defendant Criminal  
History 
Offense 
Level 
Sentencing 
Range 
Sentence 
Received 
Octavio Noris I 19 30-37  30  
Eduardo 
Deanda 
I 19 30-37 Time served 
Jorge Aguilar I 23 46-57 24 
Amaya I 42 360 to life XX 
Shawn Forbes II 25 63-78 39 
 
These four co-defendants were subject to mandatory minimum sentences, 60 
months for Noris, Deanda, and Forbes, and 120 months for Aguilar.  Three of the four 
were able to have their guideline range reduced and the mandatory minimum sentence 
waived because they were safety valve eligible, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) and 
U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2.  All four also were able to lower their guideline range by 
acceptance of responsibility, pursuant to U.S.S.G. §  3E1.1.  Three of the co-
defendants were also able to reduce their sentences through cooperation agreements 
with the prosecution. 
The prosecution argues that Amaya and these co-defendants are not similarly 
situated for sentencing purposes because all three pleaded guilty, accepted responsibility 
for their wrongdoing, cooperated with the prosecution, and testified at trial. 
Accordingly, the prosecution contends that comparing Amaya to these three co-
defendants is comparing apples to oranges.  Courts have recognized that co-defendants 
are not “similarly situated”, within the meaning of § 3553(a)(6), when one pleads guilty 
                                       
16Javier Amaya is awaiting trial. 
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and cooperates with the prosecution, and the other forces the prosecution to take the 
time and expense of going to trial.  See United States v. Susi, 674 F.3d 278, 288 (4th 
Cir. 2012) (holding that the “avoidance of unwarranted sentencing disparities does not 
require courts to sentence similarly individuals who go to trial and those who plead 
guilty. They are not similarly situated for sentencing purposes.”); United States v. 
Mitchell, 421 Fed. App’x 102, 105–106 (2d Cir. 2011) (observing that “defendants 
were not similarly situated to the co-conspirators they identify, since those defendants 
who pled guilty did so pursuant to plea agreements which dramatically reduced their 
Guidelines exposure.”); United States v. Docampo, 573 F.3d 1091, 1101 (11th Cir. 
2009) (“defendants who cooperate with the government and enter a written plea 
agreement are not similarly situated to a defendant who provides no assistance to the 
government and proceeds to trial.”); United States v. Perez–Pena, 453 F.3d 236, 243 
(4th Cir. 2006) (“[C]omparing the sentences of defendants who helped the Government 
to those of defendants who did not . . . is comparing apples and oranges. For this 
reason, Congress could not have intended that disparities resulting from the exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion could be determined to be ‘unwarranted.’”); United States v. 
Vasquez–Rivera, 470 F.3d 443, 449 (1st Cir.2006) (citation omitted) (“[A] defendant 
who chooses to enter into a plea bargain is not similarly situated to a defendant who 
contests the charges.”); United States v. Flores, 454 F.3d 149, 163 (3rd Cir. 2006) 
(holding that defendant’s co-defendants were not similarly situated because co-
defendant “had been involved in the conspiracy for a shorter time, opened fewer 
corporations, was not an attorney, and had accepted responsibility and pled guilty 
rather than going to trial.”).  I recognize that these three co-defendants are not similarly 
situated with Amaya because they have all pleaded guilty, accepted responsibility for 
their wrongdoing, cooperated with the prosecution, and testified at trial. 
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Notwithstanding the differences between Amaya and his co-defendants, 
sentencing Amaya to a sentence within his advisory guideline range is too harsh and 
creates unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants who have engaged in the 
same criminal conduct.  See United States v. Martin, 520 F.3d 87, 94 (1st Cir. 2008) 
(“[D]istrict courts have discretion, in appropriate cases, to align co-defendants’ 
sentences somewhat in order to reflect comparable degrees of culpability—at least in 
those cases where disparities are conspicuous and threaten to undermine confidence in 
the criminal justice system.”).  A 180 month sentence is still far greater than the 
sentences given Amaya’s co-defendants and results in the strange sentencing anomaly 
that his sentence will be greater than all four co-defendants combined.  Sentencing 
Amaya to a much longer sentence within his advisory guideline range would unduly 
exacerbate the disparity, run counter to § 3553(a)(6), and create a gross sentencing 
disparity. 
8.   The need to provide restitution 
The final § 3553(a) factor is “the need to provide restitution to any victims of the 
offense.”  18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(7).  This factor does not apply. 
9. Double jeopardy violation 
Finally, I consider Amaya’s argument that I should “consider the double 
jeopardy violation as a factor that would justify a variance down to 120 months.”  
Defendant’s Br. at 6.  He argues that the prosecution has not been sanctioned for 
causing two mistrials while the resulting delays have subjected him to “embarrassment, 
expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and 
insecurity for months.”  Defendant’s Br. at 7.  The prosecution asserts that Amaya’s 
argument does not support a downward variance because I have never found a double 
jeopardy violation in this case.  The prosecution is correct.   
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On December 19, 2011, the first day of our second attempt to try this case, 
defense counsel informed me that the prosecution's discovery file did not include any 
information regarding the use of GPS devices to collect evidence in this case.  Defense 
counsel reported that they had only become aware of the use of a GPS device on  
Amaya's vehicle through the testimony of the prosecution’s first witness. The 
defendants then orally moved for a mistrial, which the prosecution opposed.  I granted 
the defendants' motion for mistrial.  The defendants then orally moved to dismiss the 
case with prejudice.  After receiving briefing from the parties, I denied the defendants' 
motion for mistrial on January 26, 2012, after finding that there was no evidence that 
the prosecution intended to “goad” the defendants into moving for a mistrial.  See 
Memorandum Opinion And Order Regarding Defendants’ Oral Motion To Dismiss 
With Prejudice at 2.  Thus, I have never found a double jeopardy violation and 
conclude that the circumstances of either or both of the mistrials do not warrant a 
downward variance. 
10. Consideration 
After considering the § 3553(a) factors, I grant Amaya’s variance motion based 
on my individualized assessment of the § 3553(a) factors.  Specifically, I find that a 
sentence of 180 months imprisonment, followed by 120 months of supervised release is 
“sufficient but not greater than necessary” to achieve the purposes of sentencing.  18 
U.S.C. § 3553(a).  First, I have considered the nature and circumstances of the offense 
in arriving at this sentence.  A substantially mitigating circumstance in this case is that 
there is absolutely no evidence indicating that Amaya’s participation in these crimes 
involved any violence.  Next, I have considered Amaya’s history and characteristics in 
arriving at this sentence. Amaya is not a hardened, recidivist criminal.  He is only 25 
years old and his criminal record is limited to four, non-violent, misdemeanor 
convictions.  Amaya’s age and limited criminal record indicate an ability to be 
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rehabilitated.  I find that Amaya’s history and characteristics warrant no more 
punishment than a 180 month sentence. 
A 180 month sentence is sufficient to reflect the seriousness of the offenses and 
takes into account that this is Amaya’s first drug offense conviction.  In contrast, the 
advisory guideline range for Amaya of 360 months (30 years) to life is grossly 
excessive to achieve the goals of sentencing.  A 180 month sentence does not create 
unwarranted sentencing disparities.  
This sentence, while below that called for by the Guidelines, is still thousands of 
times longer than Amaya’s only previous term of incarceration, and thus sufficient to 
deter him.  Moreover, imprisonment is not the only manner in which Amaya is being 
punished.  I am also sentencing Amaya to 120 months of supervised release, doubling 
the minimum time called for under the Guidelines.  The Supreme Court has recognized 
that a term of supervised release involves a “substantial restriction of freedom.”  Gall,  
552 U.S. at 48.  Offenders on supervised release, like the probationer in Gall, “may 
not leave the judicial district, move, or change jobs without notifying, and in some 
cases receiving permission from, their probation officer or the court. They must report 
regularly to their probation officer, permit unannounced visits to their homes, refrain 
from associating with any person convicted of a felony, and refrain from excessive 
drinking.”  Id.  Ten years on supervised release ensures that Amaya will receive the 
supervision he needs after he leaves prison, and permits me to incarcerate him in the 
future should he fail to comply with the terms of his supervised release. 
A sentence of 180 months is a substantial amount of time to spend in prison and 
is sufficiently severe to promote respect for the law.  This sentence is also sufficiently 
lengthy to deter others.  In contrast to the advisory guideline range, a sentence of this 
length will enhance the public's confidence in the criminal justice system and not breed 
disrespect for it.    
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III. CONCLUSION 
For all of the reasons stated above, after considering all of the § 3553(a) factors, 
I find that a sentence within the advisory guideline range does not serve those factors 
and is greater than necessary to comply with the purposes of § 3553(a).  Thus, I vary 
downward from the advisory guideline sentencing range of 360 to life for Amaya’s 
offenses to 180 months.  I conclude that a sentence of 180 months is “sufficient, but not 
greater than necessary” to achieve the purposes of § 3553(a). Therefore, I grant 
Amaya’s motion for downward variance and impose a sentence of 180 months 
imprisonment followed by 120 months of supervised release.    
 IT IS SO ORDERED. 
 DATED this 11th day of June, 2013. 
 
 
      ______________________________________ 
      MARK W. BENNETT 
      U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
      NORTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA 
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